Comprising eleven chapters, Surveillance and Spies begins with a summary of civil law officials' enforcement actions early in the war and the problems they encountered. On both the state and federal levels, their investigations were hampered for many months by a lack of funding and other assistance from federal civil authorities. Consequently, Army commanders stepped into the "void left by a civilian law enforcement bureaucracy rendered incapable of pursuing major criminal conspiracy" (37). An initial priority was countering the efforts of rebel sympathizers to thwart Union recruitment of soldiers for the North's growing armies and to encourage desertion from the ranks. When Gov. Oliver P. Morton of Indiana identified the need for an energetic officer to organize troop recruitment, Washington sent Col. Henry B. Carrington. Towne describes the difficulties Carrington faced during what he calls the "Morgan County Incident." The troops he sent to an area south of Indianapolis to recover deserters twice came under fire. Several of the attackers were captured and tried, but Carrington felt the penalties imposed (light fines) were inconsequential and lacked deterrent value. Nevertheless, he had set a precedent for other commanders in dealing with similar troubles. Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, facing serious resistance to recruiting, illegal trading, and near armed insurrection, acted quickly and aggressively, threatening military action against disloyal elements. When that did not have the desired effect, he set up military commissions and ordered resisters shot.
The biggest impediments to Union efforts to counter rebellious elements were poor situational awareness and the lack of a clear policy by the Federal government. This caused friction between military commanders like Burnside, political leaders like Governor Morton, and the Lincoln administration itself. For example, after successful infiltration of secret organizations, disputes arose about the proper use of the information gained. "The wealth of intelligence created the temptation in a consummate politician like Morton to use it for immediate political effect. The upcoming elections were paramount in his mind. On the other hand, the generals saw the benefits of gathering more information and awaiting the best moment to strike." However, "convincing a preoccupied president to see the threat that existed in his home state and region proved to be an unforeseen hurdle." Appeals to Washington from his general and his political allies to settle the issue failed. Colonel Carrington wrote to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton for a statement of policy, but "no word came from federal leadership" .
The commander of the Department of Missouri, Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, could not even get a personal hearing on the rebel threat. Though the general possessed considerable intelligence on disloyal activities, Lincoln refused to receive his report in person or via one of his staff members. Towne speculates that the president wanted to avoid upsetting Gen. Ulysses Grant, who disliked Rosecrans. Ultimately, Lincoln dispatched John Hay to meet with him. When Hay returned, he found Lincoln still dismissive of the threats Rosecrans had identified: "'[he] thinks small beer of Rosey's mare's nest. Too small, I rather think.' … Lincoln was consistent in his responses to [Gov. John] Brough and [Maj. Gen. Samuel P.] Heintzelman, Rosecrans, and … [Illinois governor Richard] Yates: he would do nothing aggressive but would trust in the wisdom of the people to reject appeals for revolutionary violence by a radical and militant fringe" (225-27).
The book's last two chapters describe how close the conspiracies came to achieving some of their aims before Washington finally awoke to the danger. Though Lincoln remained skeptical of any serious problems in the Northwest until mid-summer 1864, War Department Judge Advocate Gen. Joseph Holt's investigations in the West "laid bare ... the intensely disloyal nature and revolutionary aims" (245) of the conspirators. That August, Western military authorities deployed their new reinforcements to forestall major plots to release Confederate prisoners and foment armed uprisings. Effective intelligence operations continued until the Confederate resistance collapsed in 1865.
Based on a careful analysis of material in state archives, Lincoln's Presidential Library, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress, as well as from regional historical societies, contemporary newspapers, and many secondary sources, Stephen Towne has provided a needed re-evaluation of received wisdom about the role of the Copperheads; he has persuasively demonstrated that, "all told, the army's network of spies, detectives, and informers … played a significant part in defending the United States from widespread conspiracy in the North during the American Civil War" (306). His work is a salutary reminder that the absence of a successful attack does not mean there were no actual threats or conspiracies. In this regard, successful intelligence operations, by their very nature, eliminate the most compelling evidence of a threat.
Every American war has witnessed an expansion of centralized government authority in the interest of a unified national effort. As Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War shows, the Lincoln administration was unusually reluctant to exert its power, leaving the initiative with local governments almost to the conclusion of the war. Extraordinary wartime organizations then soon dissolved as life returned to normal. There is cause for optimism in that lesson of history.
